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Summary 
While considerable evidence exists on tax responses for wage earners, less is known about the self-
employed. As they play an important role in the economy and can respond to taxation in multiple 
ways, more information on this group is needed. To give insight into this multifaceted issue, I first 
survey literature on tax-induced changes in taxable income, working hours, capital, avoidance and 
evasion, entry and exit, and organisational form. Then, I investigate the tax responsiveness of the 
Norwegian self-employed empirically. Two key responses, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) and 
the elasticity of working hours, are measured using information from two data sets, the Income 
Statistics for Families and Persons and the Labour Force Survey. By applying quasi-experimental 
techniques on these data for the period 2001 to 2010 and exploiting the tax variation induced by the 
2006 tax reform, I obtain estimates of the two responses. For the estimation of the ETI, panel data 
analysis along with an instrumental variable approach is employed. In addition, controls for mean 
reversion and trends in income are added. For the estimation of the elasticity of working hours, a 
difference-in-differences approach is adopted.  
From the empirical analysis, an ETI between 0.19 and 0.22 and an elasticity of working hours 
between 0.13 and 0.19 are found. The estimates indicate that the self-employed responded to the 
tax reform by earning more income and working more hours than they otherwise would have. These 
responses are larger than corresponding estimates for wage earners in Norway, but imply only low 
efficiency losses from income taxation of the self-employed. The difference between the ETI and the 
elasticity of working hours is seen as a “residual” effect, which include different tax responses. Under 
certain conditions, the elasticity of working hours can be interpreted as an estimate of the “real” 
effect part of the ETI, while the residual effect can be interpreted as an “elasticity of sheltering”, 
ranging from -0.06 to -0.03. This indicates that income sheltering (evasion and avoidance) is reduced 
as a result of the tax reform. However, the magnitude of the sheltering response suggests that the 
amount of income sheltered from taxation is small or that it does not respond much to tax changes. 
Hence, the evidence points to that the self-employed are responsive to tax changes, although not to 
a large extent, and that they respond more by adjusting working hours than sheltered income.   
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1. Introduction 
Equation Chapter (Ne xt) Secti on 1  
Information about tax responses is important in order to develop an efficient tax system. The size of 
a tax response can be a crucial argument in the choice of tax rates for different groups, and hence 
can have large impact on the design of the tax schedule. Mirrlees’ analysis of optimal taxation was an 
influential starting point for research into what effects must be identified to compute optimal tax 
levels (Mirrlees, 1971). It makes clear that welfare effects of taxation depend critically on how tax 
changes affect the behaviour of individuals and firms. Information about behavioural effects of 
taxation is therefore crucial from a public policy perspective.  
After Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) it has become widespread to obtain estimates of tax 
induced responses in income by analysing panel data over a tax reform period, exploiting the 
variation in tax treatment across individuals generated by tax reforms. The main focus has been on 
the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), which is a crude overall measure of the responses to tax 
changes. It is meant to capture the total effect of a tax change and to be used in welfare analysis of 
tax reforms (Feldstein, 1995; 1999). Both Lindsey and Feldstein found large elasticities. A large ETI 
can be a sign of high efficiency costs of taxation and can therefore be an argument for lowering tax 
levels. Some of Lindsey’s and Feldstein’s estimates indicated that the tax rate was on the right hand 
side of the top of the Laffer curve, meaning that revenues could be increased by reducing the tax 
rate. These articles sparked a substantial, and still ongoing, research wave into the elasticity of 
taxable income. Econometric developments for estimating the ETI have applied new methods to 
address empirical challenges in the identification in panel data. The estimated elasticities in post 
Feldstein studies have been markedly lower; see for example Auten and Carrol (1999), Aarbu and 
Thoresen (2001), Gruber and Saez (2002) and Giertz (2007). If these estimates are closer to the actual 
efficiency cost of taxation, the earlier arguments for lowering tax levels need not hold.  
For Norway, tax responses have been estimated with the ETI framework by Aarbu and Thoresen 
(2001), where a low elasticity is found on a pooled sample of wage earners and self-employed. The 
ETI framework is also used by Thoresen and Vattø (2013), where the variation according to the 2006-
reform is exploited to validate a structural model of labour supply. Similarly, their estimated 
elasticities suggest small responses for wage earners.   
Although sparse compared to evidence for wage earners, some research has been done using the ETI 
framework on tax responses for the self-employed, such as Heim (2010). He estimates the ETI for the 
self-employed in the US, and finds relatively large elasticities for this group. The real effect share of 
the ETI is deduced by findings from other articles on the relative share of tax evasion, and is then 
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found to be much smaller than the “full ETI”. Kleven and Schultz (2014) estimate the ETI for both 
wage earners and self-employed separately, and find larger responses to taxation in the latter group, 
although still in the low-response part of the literature.  
There are additional interpretational challenges when addressing behaviour of the self-employed 
compared to wage earners. In spite of the possibility that all responses to taxation are included in the 
ETI, distinguishing between different responses can be of importance, particularly for the self-
employed. For example, if there is income shifting between bases it will generally not be sufficient to 
only use the ETI for welfare analysis of tax reforms, and information about the different margins will 
be necessary (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000). Furthermore, insights into the multiple behavioural 
responses are important, not only to increase the understanding of behaviour, but also because 
there may be different policies applicable to different responses. The real response share of the ETI 
can be of particular interest for the self-employed, as it can be more informative for policy than the 
full ETI.  
The present analysis is the first study of the tax behaviour of the self-employed in Norway using the 
ETI framework. I estimate the ETI for the self-employed in Norway. In addition, I provide separate 
evidence on the hours of work response. The ETI is estimated on register income data for Norway 
(Statistics Norway, 2005) while data for hours of work is obtained from the Labour Force Survey 
(Statistics Norway, 2003). The ETI and the hours of work elasticity are compared to separate 
responses into real effects and other effects. I apply quasi-experimental techniques, using data for 
2001 to 2010, and exploiting that the 2006 tax reform generates tax variation to identify the ETI and 
the hours of work elasticity. The variation induced by the tax reform implies that different groups of 
self-employed taxpayers experience different changes in tax treatment, and hence there will be 
exogenous variation in the data which can be used to identify the effects. For the income data, I use 
panel data methods in combination with an instrumental variable approach. The instrument is 
needed to account for the endogeneity problem between income and marginal tax rates. In addition, 
there are problems with mean reversion and exogenous trends in income, and methods to account 
for this will be applied. For the working hours estimation, due to the repeated cross section nature of 
the data, I will use a standard difference-in-differences method to obtain an estimate of the elasticity 
of working hours. The thesis could be policy relevant, both as a partial evaluation of the 2006 tax 
reform in Norway and as information about the tax responses of self-employed. In addition, these 
estimates can potentially be used to validate structural models for exploring the effects of tax 
changes, in a similar way as in Thoresen and Vattø (2007).  
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The self-employed represent a challenge by being subject to multiple possible definitions, ranging 
from self-reported self-employment status to sole proprietors and definitions based on income 
shares. Whichever definition is applied, the self-employed are an important part of most economies. 
While the number of self-employed in developing countries is generally higher, there are substantial 
amounts of self-employment also in developed countries. However, Norway seems to have a lower 
degree of self-employment than other OECD-countries (Parker, 2006). When earning business 
income is used as the definition of self-employment, there were 333,656 self-employed in Norway in 
2013 (Statistics Norway, 2014). Furthermore, the self-employed are a diverse group. They consist of 
independent professionals (dentists, lawyers and so on), farmers, creative workers, craftsmen, 
owners of small shops and grocery stores, and subcontractors and so on. The diversity means that 
there could be great heterogeneity in responses to taxation, as possibilities for evasion, avoidance, 
time shifting and base shifting may differ widely between these groups. This large heterogeneity 
represents a challenge when measuring tax responses.  
An important aspect when measuring behaviour of the self-employed is their greater possibilities to 
reduce tax burden by changing working hours, shifting income across bases and time, and avoiding or 
evading taxation. These wider possibilities for behavioural responses to taxation make the self-
employed particularly interesting from a tax research point of view. However, it does also complicate 
the analysis. The wider scope for the self-employed comes in different forms, and may give 
considerable interpretational problems when discussing effects of tax changes. Firstly, it is almost 
impossible to distinguish between returns to capital and returns to labour for the self-employed. 
When tax changes affect the use of capital in the firm, the consequence is a potential identification 
problem in the empirical analysis, as the effect on capital and labour cannot be separated. This stems 
from the fact that in many cases it is hard to draw a line between the self-employed person and the 
firm. As some of the income is derived from capital and some from work efforts, the tax system may 
split the two in some way, giving different incentives for capital and labour efforts. Secondly, tax 
evasion and avoidance lead to differences between reported income and actual income. These 
responses may create a disparity between real effects and total effects. Thirdly, the self-employed 
may respond to tax changes by shifting organisational form, which also complicates empirical 
research. 
Taxation of the self-employed has been of particular concern in the design of the Norwegian dual 
income tax. From 1992, income was split into capital and labour, assigning a flat and low tax rate on 
capital income and an additional progressive tax rate on labour income. With the revision of the dual 
income tax in the 2006 tax reform, a more equal treatment of the self-employed and other 
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organisational forms was introduced, mainly because of tax-payers avoiding the split model. The tax 
reform did also lower surtax rates, which is the central variation used for identification here. 
The thesis will proceed as follows: The next section introduces the main theoretical concepts used in 
the thesis. Here the emphasis will be on the ETI and the elasticity of hours work. Four additional 
responses will be introduced. The third section surveys literature on tax induced behaviour of the 
self-employed. The fourth section will explain the main tax changes introduced by the 2006 tax 
reform, the data used in estimating the responses and the specifications used in these estimations. 
The fifth section will present the results. Finally, the last section summarizes the main findings and 
concludes.   
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2. Concepts in Self-Employed’s Responses to Taxation 
Equation Chapter (Ne xt) Secti on 1  
In this section, some tax response concepts are introduced. The key concepts are the elasticity of 
taxable income (ETI) and the elasticity of hours, but also capital responses, avoidance and evasion, 
entry and exit, and organisational shifts will be discussed. The ETI and the elasticity of hours are of 
particular importance for this study, as they are the two responses that will be measured.  
Each of these tax responses can be characterized as real or shifting and sheltering. Real responses are 
typically changes in working hours, effort, savings and investment. Shifting and sheltering responses 
are for instance income shifting across time or base and changes in evasion and avoidance. Slemrod 
(1992) suggests a way to classify tax responses according to their responsiveness. His behavioural 
hierarchy postulates that timing effects are the top of the hierarchy. There can be large incentives to 
realize or delay gains before a tax reform takes place. Income that is easily delayed or forwarded can 
react strongly to such tax reforms. At the next step in the hierarchy is shifting between bases and 
evasion or avoidance. Lastly, at the bottom of the hierarchy, are real responses. 
 
2.1 Elasticity of taxable income 
This section will present the underlying behavioural model leading to the ETI in a framework for the 
self-employed. Some central properties and issues concerning the ETI will also be discussed. The 
exposition is inspired by Saez et al (2012).  
To present the ETI in a setting fit for the self-employed, it is assumed that the self-employed have 
one firm each, where their labour is the only input in production and has constant returns to scale. 
This does not mean that the self-employed do not use capital in their production, but that I assume 
the use of capital to be fixed, which can be interpreted as a short-term model of responses to 
taxation. The constant returns to scale assumption can be understood as a linear approximation 
around a small change in the hours worked. In addition, the price on the consumption good are 
normalised to one, and the self-employed are assumed to produce this kind of consumption good. 
Then the firm’s production function will be 
 𝑥 = 𝑓(ℎ), (2.1) 
which, by constant returns to scale, will equal 
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 𝑓(ℎ) = 𝑓′(ℎ)ℎ = 𝑤ℎ . (2.2) 
The marginal productivity of labour in the self-employed’s business will be called self-employed 
wage, w.  
The self-employed are assumed to have a utility function described by 
 𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑧) , (2.3) 
which depends positively on consumption, 𝑐, but negatively on reported or taxable income, 𝑧, 
defined as 
 𝑧 = 𝑤ℎ − 𝑠 , (2.4) 
where ℎ is hours of work and 𝑠 is income sheltered (by legal or illegal means). Introducing 
dependence on reported income makes it possible to incorporate other behavioural margins than 
labour supply. The negative effect of reported income can be interpreted as costly efforts to obtain 
income. If effort increases, utility falls. However, by increasing effort, reported income increases and 
this relaxes the budget constraint. Efforts can include both the utility cost of working hours or of 
sheltering income. 
Each self-employed individual will then maximize utility subject to the budget constraint 
 max 
𝑐,𝑧
{𝑢(𝑐, 𝑧)}   𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑐 ≤ (1 − 𝜏)𝑧 + 𝑠 + 𝐸 , (2.5) 
where  𝜏 is the marginal tax rate and 𝐸 is non-labour income. The maximization leads to  
 𝑧 = 𝑧(1 − 𝜏, 𝐸) , (2.6) 
which means that taxable income is implicitly defined as a function of the marginal tax rate and non-
labour income. Now, as taxable income is chosen for each individual self-employed for a given 
marginal tax level, the elasticity of taxable income is 
 𝑒𝐸𝑇𝐼 =
1 − 𝜏
𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕(1 − 𝜏) 
 , (2.7) 
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where 𝜏 is the marginal tax rate and 𝑧 is taxable income. It is the percent change in taxable income 
by increasing the net-of-tax rate by one percent. The ETI can, under certain conditions, be 
interpreted as an overall measure of the responses to tax changes. 
Feldstein (1999) showed that the marginal welfare loss from raising the income tax rate can be 
expressed purely as a function of the ETI, which means that it has the potential for being a sufficient 
statistic. This conveys that on the margin the ETI incorporates all responses to taxation in a correct 
manner for welfare analysis. The reason is that the opportunity costs of reducing taxable income will 
in equilibrium be equalised for all types of responses. Given that that the private and social costs of 
sheltering one krone of income are the same for all types of behavioural responses, the elasticity of 
taxable income will a sufficient statistic (Slemrod and Gilitzer, 2014). The formal arguments for this 
are presented and derived in Appendix A.1. 
Saez et al (2012) however, argue that the ETI, the way it is derived, depends on the tax system and 
on the particular reform, and is therefore not a “deep” structural parameter. Moreover, if the social 
and private costs of reduced taxable income are different, the change in welfare will not equal the 
ETI. This can happen if evading taxes induces other to evade taxes, because then the social costs of 
tax evasion are larger than the private costs, or if taxable income is sheltered by giving money to 
charity (Chetty, 2009). A point emphasized by Harju and Matikka (2014) is that the ETI will not 
incorporate all welfare effects on the margin if there are different tax rates at different tax bases, 
and some of the change in taxable income is income being moved to another tax base.  
Heim (Heim, 2010) distinguishes between three main types of tax responses for the self-employed: a 
real effect, a reporting effect and a base effect. The real effect consists mainly of changes in working 
hours and work effort. The reporting effect is the change in reporting income caused by the tax 
reform. The base effect is the change in which base the income is reported induced by the reform. 
Together these three main types of effects constitute the ETI.  
Given the framework set up here, ETI can be partioned into an hours worked elasticity and a 
“sheltering elasticity” 
 𝑒𝐸𝑇𝐼 =
1 − 𝜏
𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕(1 − 𝜏) 
=
1 − 𝜏
𝑧
𝜕(𝑤ℎ − 𝑠)
𝜕(1 − 𝜏)
 (2.8) 
 = 𝑤
1 − 𝜏
𝑧
𝜕ℎ
𝜕(1 − 𝜏)
−
1 − 𝜏
𝑧
𝜕𝑠
𝜕(1 − 𝜏)
 .  (2.9) 
8 
 
The first part relates to the hours worked and the latter part to the sheltering. The elasticity of 
sheltering responses, which often is unobserved, can then be seen as 
 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 –  𝐸𝑇𝐼 . (2.10) 
Hence, if sheltering is decreasing in the net-of-tax rate, meaning that the elasticity of sheltering is 
negative, the ETI will be larger than the elasticity of hours. The relationship will be investigated in the 
empirical part of the thesis.  
If sheltering decreases when the net-of-tax rate increases, the efficiency loss of increasing taxes is 
higher than it otherwise would have been. This effect comes from the fact that the self-employed 
incur costs by sheltering, and that these costs are reduced when sheltering is reduced. For the 
welfare assessment of tax changes based on the ETI to be correct, a crucial assumption is that the 
private costs of sheltering and reducing hours of work equal the social costs of the two. As this 
assumption need not hold, for example if part of what is sheltered also is taxed but at a lower tax 
rate, then the efficiency loss of reduced labour supply is higher than of increased sheltering. The size 
of the two elasticities constituting the ETI, working hours and sheltering, is then of interest to policy 
makers when designing the tax schedule. Furthermore, different policy measures may be effective 
for different responses. If sheltering can be reduced more effectively by increasing penalties for tax 
evasion, understanding the size of sheltering can be of direct policy relevance. In addition, a 
decomposition of different behavioural responses can provide a better understanding of responses 
to taxation. Therefore, this thesis will now turn to the anatomy of tax responses. 
 
2.2 Elasticity of working hours 
Now, the same framework used for income can be applied to working hours as well. To emphasize 
the choice of hours and to derive the hours of work elasticity, income sheltering is ignored here. 
Let a self-employed’s utility now be characterized as 
 𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) , (2.11) 
where 𝑐 is consumption and 𝑙 is leisure. I assume that 𝑢′𝑐 > 0 and 𝑢𝑙
′ > 0, and I abstract from 
intertemporal considerations in this theoretical set up. 
The budget constraint is then given by 
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 𝑐 ≤ (1 − 𝜏)𝑤ℎ + 𝐸 , (2.12) 
which will hold with equality as utility is strictly increasing in 𝑐. 𝜏 is the marginal tax rate, h is hours 
worked, 𝑤 is the wage rate and 𝐸 is non-labour income, for example transfers.  
The time constraint is given by 
 𝑇 = 𝑙 + ℎ , (2.13) 
where 𝑇 is total time. 
Assuming the self-employed is a utility maximizer 
 max
𝑐,𝑙
{𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙)}   𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤ℎ + 𝐸   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑇 = 𝑙 + ℎ (2.14) 
which is equivalent to 
 max
ℎ
{𝑢((1 − 𝜏)𝑤ℎ + 𝐸, 𝑇 − ℎ)} . (2.15) 
Thus, by the first order condition we have  
 
𝑢𝑐
′
𝑢𝑙
′ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤 , (2.16) 
which with the budget constraint implicitly determines hours worked and consumption jointly for the 
self-employed. 𝐼 is defined as full income, which is the monetary value of the time available plus non-
labour income, 
 𝐼 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑇 + 𝐸 . (2.17) 
Hence, 
 ℎ = ℎ(𝑤, 𝜏, 𝐼) . (2.18) 
Increasing the marginal tax rate has a direct effect and an effect through full income. This is the 
substitution and income effect 
 
𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝜏
=
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝜏
=  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝜏
− 𝑤𝑇
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝐼
  . (2.19) 
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An increase in the tax rate has an ambiguous effect on the hours worked of the agent, as the income 
and substitution effect go different ways. The substitution effect will be negative, because, as leisure 
becomes cheaper when the marginal tax rate rises, fewer hours will be worked. The income effect is 
positive, as increased tax reduces income, which reduces the demand for all goods, including leisure. 
It is often assumed that the substitution effect is larger than the income effect, but this is an 
empirical question. 
Now, the elasticity is the percent change in hours worked when the marginal net of tax rate increases 
by one percent 
 𝑒𝐻 =
1 − 𝜏
ℎ
𝜕ℎ
𝜕(1 − 𝜏)
 . (2.20) 
This elasticity will be estimated for the self-employed in the empirical part. The elasticity has to be 
multiplied by 
𝑤ℎ
𝑧
 , where 𝑧 is taxable income, to transfer it to the working hours effect on reported 
income, which is needed to be compare it to the ETI 
 𝑒𝐻𝐼 = 𝑤
1 − 𝜏
𝑧
𝜕ℎ
𝜕(1 − 𝜏)
 . (2.21) 
If the ETI and the elasticity of hours are not equal, there will be a “residual” effect, which can include 
capital responses, changes in evasion or avoidance, changes in effort and in principle all other 
income-generating behaviour responses that are not hours of work. These effects can go in opposite 
directions, meaning that the ETI can be both larger and smaller than the elasticity of hours. Given the 
framework set up in Section 2.1, this residual can be given the interpretation of a “sheltering 
elasticity”. This rests on the assumption that all other income-generating behaviour is either not 
responding to tax changes or does not respond in the short term. The “residual” effect may also 
include other types of responses, and some of these will now be discussed. 
 
2.3 Capital responses 
The measurement of tax responses for the self-employed is further complicated by this group of tax-
payers being responsive to changes in the taxation of capital. Changes to marginal tax rates on 
income can affect the amount of capital used in the self-employed’s firms. When there is a separate 
tax rate on labour and capital, changes to both tax rates may have an impact. A lower marginal tax 
rate on capital will increase the incentive to invest in capital relatively to labour efforts. In addition, 
the profitability of the firm will be higher, further increasing the incentives to invest in capital. If 
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marginal tax rates on labour are reduced, this can induce the self-employed to use less capital in 
their firm by a substitution effect, because their labour efforts will then have a higher net return 
compared to capital than before. However, the income effect of lower marginal tax rates may induce 
the self-employed to expand, and by that invest in more capital. This renders the net effect of labour 
income tax changes on capital use undecidable by theory. There can be great heterogeneity in 
responses, as self-employed in different sectors will have very different capital intensities and 
possibilities for changing their capital use.  
Capital responses can potentially be a part of the ETI, as a change in the amount of capital used in 
the firm will affect taxable income, just as changes in working hours do. Capital responses possibly 
take longer time than other behavioural responses, and may not represent a large share given the 
three years responses often used in the ETI literature, but could be an important part of long term 
elasticities for self-employed in capital incentive sectors. Capital investment is also an important 
mean for moving income across time. If tax rates are going to be reduced in the near future, the self-
employed might decide to invest now to reduce profits in this period, and then increase profits when 
the tax rates are lower. Because of the close relationship between the self-employed individual and 
the firm, it is almost impossible to distinguish between income derived from capital and income 
derived from labour effort, even though the dual income tax system of Norway included a procedure 
to do so. As income derived from capital is not clearly defined for the self-employed, it is difficult to 
identify capital responses.  
 
2.4 Avoidance and evasion 
Further, tax avoidance and evasion affect the total response to taxation. Avoidance is here defined as 
legal measures to avoid taxation, while evasion is defined as illegal measures. Avoidance can take 
many forms, for example by transferring income from the business owner to the spouse or buying 
inventory for the firm that is also used for personal purposes. Evasion can be direct underreporting 
of income, over-reporting of business expenditures, and so on. The “sheltering response” measured 
in the thesis include both tax evasion and avoidance responses. 
One of the first attempts to theoretically model tax evasion was done by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972). They laid important foundations into the relation between risk aversion and fraction of 
income declared. Their model implies that there is both a substitution and income effect of 
increasing taxation on tax evasion. The substitution effect is that higher tax rates increases the 
incentive to evade because the gain of doing so is larger. The income effect is that a higher tax rate 
will decrease income, which again can decrease the willingness to take risks if risk-aversion is 
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decreasing in income. Therefore, depending on risk-aversion, increased taxation can either increase 
or decrease tax evasion. As their theoretical investigation gave no clear conclusion on the sign of the 
response, empirical work was needed to gain more knowledge on the relation between taxation and 
evasion.  
Evasion and avoidance can be responses that are substitutes for real responses. If the self-employed 
can respond to higher taxation by evading more, instead of working less, there will be smaller real 
responses than if there were no possibilities for evasion (Slemrod, 2002). Therefore, labour supply 
responses as a measure of real responses might be biased downward when there are significant 
amounts of tax evasion and this is a substitute for real responses.  
 
2.5 Entry and exit 
An important behavioural response to taxation is selection in and out of self-employment. If either 
employees or self-employed have a particularly favourable tax treatment, this may induce people to 
change from the one to the other. Much of the literature on the self-employed is concerned about 
this extensive margin. There are models for entry and exit into self-employment, and how this relates 
to the tax rate (Bruce, 2002). The emphasis on entry and exit can be understood as an interest in the 
entrepreneurial side of the economy. More self-employed may be related to more entrepreneurial 
activity, although the link between self-employment and entrepreneurship is disputed (Parker, 2006).  
With risk-averse agents choosing between wage and self-employment income, there is an ambiguity 
in the sign of the effect of taxation on the choice of being self-employed (Bruce, 2002). One way to 
explore this, as is done in Bruce (2002) and Paul and Bechtold (2015), is to have a model where self-
employment income will differ if the self-employed is successful or unsuccessful. The uncertainty in 
the gains of self-employment has important consequences. From this, one potential relation 
between self-employment and tax rates is that a higher tax rate decreases self-employment, through 
that less of the gains if successful is accrued to the self-employed. However, depending on the risk 
aversion, another possibility is that high tax rates might function as a kind of insurance against bad 
outcomes. This can lead to the tax rates having a positive effect on self-employment. In addition, 
high tax levels might make the possibility for evading taxes more valuable, which could also increase 
the incentives for being self-employed. Because the total effect of tax levels on the choice of being 
self-employed is ambiguous, empirical evidence on this is necessary. 
Both the marginal tax rate and the average tax rate might influence the decision about self-
employment. Which tax rate is the appropriate depends on whether the decision about being self-
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employed is a one-off decision or a decision about whether the next earned krone will be in self-
employment or wage. For the former case, the average tax rate is the appropriate variable of 
interest, for the latter case it is the marginal tax rate. 
 
2.6 Organisational shifts 
Another opportunity for the self-employed is to shift income between bases. For the Norwegian self-
employed, this can mainly be done by changing organisational form. It is closely related to entry and 
exit into self-employment, as organisational changes normally will be visible as entries or exits. The 
organisational shifts can take various forms, depending on the specific system in the country 
considered. Organisational shifts can have important consequences, as it changes the group that 
remains self-employed. This is important because organisational shifting changes the sample used for 
estimation and the shifting may be related to the marginal tax levels, income and working hours. 
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3. Survey of Self-Employed’s Responses to Taxation 
Equation Chapter (Ne xt) Secti on 1  
In this section, I will present some empirical evidence on the different margins discussed in Section 2.  
 
3.1 ETI for the self-employed 
A few studies have used the ETI methodology to study the behavioural responses of the self-
employed. Blow and Preston (2002) use the methodology to estimate the ETI and emphasize the self-
employed’s potential for exemptions, as well as avoidance and evasion. As they do not have panel 
data available, they use a grouping estimator on repeated cross-section survey data. Their conclusion 
is that the taxation of self-employed is associated with a moderate deadweight loss.  
Heim (2010) estimates the elasticity of taxable income for the self-employed in the U.S. Panel data 
analysis is used and the data covers the years from 1987 to 1996. The paper aims to aggregate the 
real, reporting and base effect to an overall measure, which is the elasticity of taxable income. By 
doing this, an overall elasticity is estimated to be around 0.9, with a real elasticity counterpart of 0.4. 
The former estimate is considerably higher than most estimates of the ETI for wage earners. The 
endogeneity of the marginal tax rate is accounted for by instrumenting the change in tax rates by the 
tax rate the individual would have faced three years later if the income in the base year was inflated 
three years forward. Two particular issues to the panel data analysis, mean reversion and exogenous 
trends in income, are addressed in Heim’s paper. Firstly, they are tackled by adding a ten piece spline 
in the base year income, and secondly, by adding ten piece splines in the log of lagged income and in 
the deviation of log of lagged income from base year log income. Adding these controls affects the 
results to a large extent, and reduces the estimated elasticity.   
To obtain a real elasticity, net of underreporting, Heim uses estimates from two other papers to do a 
calculation of the share of non-reported business income. Hence, Heim’s real elasticity includes both 
the real effect and the base shifting effect, which is the effect of shifting taxes between the corporate 
sector and the personal. In the robustness check, the base shifting effect is controlled for by doing 
some sample restrictions, which should reduce the importance of shifting. By doing this, the 
estimated elasticity increases, but is not significantly different from the main estimate. Income 
shifting across years is controlled for by estimating the shifting forward and shifting backward 
elasticities. Controlling for this changes the elasticity slightly, to just above 1. At last, Heim 
distinguishes between two explanations of the higher elasticity for the self-employed. The first 
possibility is that more tax responsive individuals select into self-employment, while the second is 
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that self-employment income is easier changed. Heim finds support for the second explanation by 
estimating the elasticity of wages for the self-employed, which is found to be low.  
Kleven and Schultz (2014) estimate the ETI for both wage earners and the self-employed on Danish 
data. Both the elasticity of labour income and the total elasticity of taxable income are found to be 
about twice as large for the self-employed compared to the wage earners. However, both are 
relatively small. They find that as the net of tax rate increases by one percent, the taxable income 
increases by about 0.10 percent. Their estimates are robust to different specifications and definitions 
of income. This is a much lower estimate than Heim (2010) finds for the U.S.; see explanation in 
Kleven and Schultz (2014).  
Harju and Matikka (2014) investigate the ETI on Finnish data and find business income to be much 
more responsive than wage income. In addition, they present evidence for substantial income 
shifting among business owners, including the self-employed, which leads the real effect part of the 
ETI to be substantially smaller than the “full ETI”.  
Identification of tax effects by studying bunching around kink points is also used to assess 
responsiveness of the self-employed; see e.g. Saez (2010) and Chetty et al (2011) for explanations of 
the method. It is closely related to the regression discontinuity approach. While in regression 
discontinuity a cut off induces that it is close to random whether people are on one side or on the 
other side of the cut off, bunching uses the opposite fact. People would be continuously spread 
around different marginal tax rates if they were not bunching at kink points. This “excess mass” 
under the kink point can be used to estimate the total response to change in marginal tax rates, the 
ETI. One caveat with the approach is that the ETI is only estimated for those that bunch and not as a 
weighted average of responses over the whole tax schedule. Although the usual ETI estimates also 
are local in the sense that they are only estimated for those who are moved by the instrument, the 
bunching method induces a different and further locality. In that sense, the bunching method is a 
particularly local estimate of tax responses. An important finding in the bunching literature is that it 
is mainly the self-employed who bunch. Hence, there has been a particular emphasis on the self-
employed in recent articles using the bunching method.  
Le Maire and Scherning (2013) apply this method to the Danish self-employed. They find an ETI in the 
range 0.43 to 0.53, without correcting for income shifting, and when income shifting is corrected for, 
an ETI of 0.14 to 0.20. Their findings indicate that it is the possibility of retaining earnings that 
explains the large difference between the uncorrected and corrected ETI. The self-employed are 
defined as those who have self-employment as their main activity, and they argue that the stricter 
definition of self-employment used in their analysis explains most of the differences in elasticities 
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compared to the finding by Kleven and Schultz (2014). Bastani and Selin (2014) apply the method to 
Swedish data, for both wage earners and self-employed. They do not find any evidence of bunching 
among wage earners, but find significant bunching among the self-employed. However, the 
elasticities implied from the bunching among the self-employed are low, ranging from 0.02 to 0.07, 
depending on how broad the definition of self-employment is set to be. Some aspects of the 
anatomy of responses for the self-employed is explored, where the focus is on deduction 
possibilities. Their conclusion is that the tax response of the self-employed is not a real labour supply 
response, but a result of income shifting across time and base.  
 
3.2 Choice of hours 
An early contribution on working hours responses of the self-employed was made by Wales (1973). 
The main question of interest is whether the self-employed are on the backward bending part of the 
labour supply curve or not. The fact that hours of work also influence the tax rate is an important 
endogeneity problem in the empirical analysis. This is tackled by an instrumental variable method. 
His findings indicate that most of the self-employed are not on the backward bending part, and 
hence would react to increased taxation by reducing hours of work. Relatively small estimates are 
found for the elasticity of leisure with respect to the surtax rate, with a mean of 0.07 for those with 
positive elasticities and a mean of -0.04 for those with negative elasticities. This corresponds to 
labour supply elasticises of about -0.17 and 0.01, respectively.  
Parker et al (2005) argue that wage uncertainty is the main driver of differences in hours supplied by 
self-employed compared to wage earners. This is a structural approach on panel data, meaning that 
identification is theory driven. They refute other proposed explanations than wage uncertainty, for 
example different tastes for leisure or indivisibility in production. Without controlling for wage risk, 
they find significant negative effect of wage on hours worked for the self-employed, while the effect 
is positive for employees. When the risk measure is included, the point estimates of the wage effect 
fall in absolute value and become insignificant. They are however still negative. Risk is estimated to 
have a positive effect on hours worked for the self-employed, explaining part of the higher number 
of hours worked for this group. As risk may also be affected by tax changes, this can have important 
policy consequences. 
There are several studies which focus on the effect of wages on working hours for specific groups of 
self-employed. For example, some studies analyse the labour supply of New York taxi drivers; see 
Camerer et al (1997), Farber (2005) and Ashenfelter et al (2010). Camerer et al (1997) employ 
relatively simple methods, and find large negative wage elasticity, which indicates that taxi drivers 
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work one day at a time and work towards an income target for each day. They use an IV approach to 
control for measurement error, where each cabdrivers wage is instrumented by the wage 
distribution of the other cabdrivers on the same day. Their chosen specification yields an estimate 
close to -1, which is interpreted as no evidence of intertemporal substitution in the short term. The 
finding is contrasted by Farber (2005), who employ a different measure of the daily wage rate and 
use a different empirical method. His method is structural, as he estimates a “stopping model” for 
the taxi drivers. One of the critiques of the Camerer et al paper presented by Farber is that they 
assume wage to be constant over the day, which is at odds with the evidence provided by Farber. 
The stopping model gives no significant effect of income earned that day, but a negative effect of 
hours worked. This is more in line with the theoretical predictions of the neoclassical consumption-
leisure model. Ashenfelter et al (2010) use panel data and exogenous changes in the wage rate to 
obtain estimates of the long run elasticity. This is closer to a quasi-experimental approach, as they do 
not use model properties to identify the effect, but exogenous variation in the data. They find a 
significant effect of about -0.2, which they consider as evidence for that the income effect dominates 
over the substitution effect for the long-run labour supply. Hence the three articles give widely 
different answers to the labour supply of taxi drivers. 
 
3.3 Capital responses 
Carroll et al (2000) investigate the investment decision of the entrepreneur and how it is affected by 
income taxation. Their definition of an entrepreneur is a sole proprietor, which is also a possible 
definition of the self-employed. They consider two ways for the tax rate to impact capital 
investment. Firstly, changes in the tax rate alter the use cost of capital, and hence can affect the 
investment decision. Secondly, if liquidity constraints are present, a change in the tax rate might 
affect this constraint. Then, with this in mind, they do a multivariate analysis on data on sole 
proprietors for 1985 and 1988 to estimate the effects of tax changes on capital investment. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, where high earners were given considerable marginal tax rate reductions, is 
used to obtain exogenous variation. They conclude that high-income tax rates decreases the 
probability of making capital investments, and that the effect is rather large. This means that the tax 
rate can have an important effect on the use of capital for the self-employed.  
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3.4 Avoidance and evasion 
Evidence indicates that the type of income is crucial to whether tax evasion takes place or not, and 
self-employment income is found to be the type of income that has the largest proportion of 
evasion; see Feldman and Slemrod (2007) and Slemrod (2007). The self-employed capture a central 
position in the tax evasion literature as they are sometimes used for identification, under the 
assumption that they evade, and wage earners do not. The wider scope for avoidance and evasion 
exist mainly because the self-employed report their own income, while employers report the income 
of their employees; so-called third party reporting. In addition, the self-employed are often found in 
sectors where there is person-to-person interaction, which simplifies the act of evading taxes. 
There are three main approaches to estimate tax evasion: direct, indirect and model based. The 
direct method uses information from tax auditing or surveys, the indirect uses different indicators of 
evasion to estimate the amount, while the model based approach builds a model of the incentives 
and effects of tax evasion. One popular indirect approach is the Pissarides and Weber approach 
(Pissarides and Weber, 1989). It consists of comparing the relation between income and food 
consumption for the self-employed and compare it to similar income groups that are not self-
employed. The crucial assumptions are that food consumption is the same for self-employed and 
employees at similar levels of income and that there is no tax evasion among employees. If there is 
some underreporting also among employees, this can be a lower bound estimate of tax evasion.  
Johansson (2005) apply the Pissarides and Weber approach on Finnish data. He finds the amount of 
underreported income among households where the head of the household is self-employed to be 
16.5 percent. To correct for the possible endogeneity of income, he uses multiple instruments, 
including house ownership and spouse’s labour supply, to obtain a 2SLS estimate. The OLS and 2SLS 
estimates are not very different. Engström and Holmlund (2009) apply the same method on Swedish 
data. They use income from capital and property tax as instruments for income, to correct for 
possible endogeneity and some of the temporality of current income. The estimates are however 
very similar in the OLS and the IV specification. Their results indicate that the self-employed 
underreport income by 30 percent. This corresponds to 35 percent of self-employed income among 
the individuals that underreport. Furthermore, they show that the amount of underreporting is lower 
among the self-employed that have incorporated business. This means that there potentially can be 
a cross effect of tax changes on evasion and organisational form, as some organisational forms imply 
large possibilities for evasion.  
Kleven et al (2011) investigate three different aspects of tax evasion using an experiment. The 
experiment consists of sending threats of auditing to Danish taxpayers by randomization. Their first 
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finding is that tax evasion is small because those who have a third party report their income evade 
very little. Those who self-report their income, however, evade to a much larger extent. This is 
evidence of the larger scope for evasion among the self-employed compared to wage earners. Their 
second finding is that tax evasion increases when the marginal tax rate increases, which is found by 
using the bunching method along with their auditing experiment. The findings indicate that the 
evasion response is small compared to legal avoidance responses and real behaviour responses. 
Lastly, they find that auditing has a large negative effect on tax evasion. This may point to auditing as 
a more effective policy towards tax evasion than lowering tax levels, if the costs of audits are not too 
high compared to the costs of changing the tax schedule.  
Kleven and Schultz (2014) argue that their small differences in elasticities for taxable and broad 
income are evidence for a small degree of tax avoidance and evasion in Denmark. Their point is that 
if there were large possibilities for avoidance and evasion, the self-employed would have responded 
by changing their amount of avoidance and evasion when the tax rates changed. 
 
3.5 Entry and exit 
The tax effect on the choice to be self-employed is widely discussed in the literature. Long (1982) 
analysed the effect of differential tax treatment of wage and self-employment income, and 
emphasized the welfare costs related to inducing a different labour allocation than the most 
efficient. His cross section analysis reveals that men who are married, older and live in a rural area 
are more likely to be self-employed. Furthermore, the main result is that higher tax levels induce 
more self-employment. The mechanism that is proposed is that the self-employed have larger 
possibilities for tax evasion, and hence the benefit of being self-employed are larger compared to 
wage work when the tax level is high.  
A quasi-experimental approach to entry and exit has been done by Fossen and Steiner (2009), who 
use two German tax reforms to identify the effect of income taxes on selection into entrepreneurial 
activity. In their difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator, they have “tradesmen” with 
income above a certain threshold as the treated group and assign “liberal professions” and self-
employed with incomes below a certain threshold, who did not experience a change in tax rates, as 
control groups. Their implied elasticity of self-employment probability with respect to the marginal 
tax rate is -1.36, which is a rather large effect. The results are consistent only if incomes in the 
treatment and control groups would have followed the same trend in the absence of the tax reform. 
This counterfactual assumption is by definition impossible to test, but they support the assumption 
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by showing that the trends were fairly equal before the tax reform took place. Their results imply 
that lower marginal tax rates for the self-employed will lead to a higher number of self-employed.  
Evidence on the relation between taxes and the choice of being self-employed for a Nordic tax 
system is found in Hansson (2012). She contrasts the Swedish tax treatment of the self-employed, 
which is fairly similar to the Norwegian, to the American system. It is explained that the American tax 
system might encourage risk-taking through a favourable tax treatment and ex post choosing of 
organisational form, while the Swedish system is argued to be more neutral, in the sense that 
employees and self-employed are treated relatively similarly. These differences can influence the 
sign of the tax response, where Hansson argues that it is likelier that the effect of taxes on 
entrepreneurial activity will be negative in Sweden than in US. This is related to the relationship 
between risk and tax levels, as mentioned in section 2.5. Her findings indicate a small, negative effect 
of both average and marginal tax levels on the probability of being self-employed, supporting her 
hypothesis. 
 
3.6 Organisational shifts 
Carroll and Joulfaian (1997) explore the relation between taxes and organisational form for 
corporations in the US around the tax reform of 1986. They find a significant effect of tax changes on 
organisational form, with an implied tax rate elasticity of 0.20. Furthermore, they discover that those 
who change organisational form experience higher growth than those who do not. 
Organisational shifts in Norway are discussed in Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2010). They find strong 
evidence of substantial organisational shifting among small businesses over the period 1993 to 2003. 
The organisational shifting is induced by the dual income tax system, which treats income from self-
employment and corporations differently. Incentives to change organisational form were particularly 
strong for the groups that had a large labour share in their production. The substantial organisational 
shifting might bias the estimates of the ETI and the working hours elasticity. One way this can work, 
is that the more successful self-employed change their organisational form, and therefore move out 
of the definition of the self-employed. How to account for this will depend on the definition of self-
employment. As the incentives for organisational shifting were reduced by the 2006 tax reform, it 
might be an important behavioural response for the self-employed around the reform. Reduced 
incentives for organisational shifting could result in more individuals staying in the “liable business” 
category. The effects on the elasticities measured in this thesis will depend on the characteristics of 
the self-employed that would have changed organisational form under the old tax regime, but did 
not because of the tax reform.  
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4. Empirical Strategy 
Equation Chapter (Ne xt) Secti on 1  
This section will begin by explaining the most important changes in taxation of the self-employed in 
the period of investigation. Afterwards, the data sources will be introduced and discussed, and the 
empirical modelling choices and specifications will be explained. Data from the period 2001 to 2010 
will be exploited to derive estimates of tax responsiveness. This period includes a major revision of 
the dual income tax of Norway in 2006. 
 
4.1 The Norwegian Tax System 
The Norwegian dual income tax system was introduced in 1992. This meant that capital income was 
taxed at a low and constant rate, while wage income was taxed at an additional progressive tax rate. 
It was implemented by a 28 percent rate on corporate income, capital income and labour income, 
and an additional surtax on labour income. In 2004, the last year before the tax reform (phased in in 
2005), the two-tier surtax consisted of rates at 13.5 percent for the first bracket (income exceeding 
354,300 NOK) and 19.5 percent for the second bracket (income exceeding 906,900 NOK). 
As the dual income tax system gave a more lenient tax treatment of capital income compared to 
wage income, there were large incentives for the self-employed to characterize their income as 
capital income. To address this, a split model was introduced to reduce the incentives to re-
characterize income. With the split model, part of income was made liable for the surtax, depending 
on the measure of imputed labour. Imputed labour was calculated as the taxable profits net of 
imputed return to capital, which was an imputation rate set by the government, multiplied by total 
assets and human capital contributions. This imputed labour income was then taxed as labour 
income, while the imputed capital income was taxed at the low constant rate. Income above a 
certain point (34 G, where G = 58,139 NOK in 2004) was again taxed at the low constant rate, 
suggesting that high incomes are derived mainly from capital. However, tax rates for the highest 
incomes changed up to 2004, when a range of very high incomes were taxed according to surtax 
rates, before returning to the low constant rate for the highest incomes. The split model made it in 
some sense possible for the tax system to tax income derived from labour and capital at different 
rates for the self-employed. 
However, the liability for imputed labour income to the surtax made the incentives for organisational 
shifting large. As incorporated businesses were only taxed at a low constant rate, there were large 
incentives for the self-employed to incorporate, and then avoiding the split model and being paid by 
dividends. The incentives were particularly prominent for those with large imputed labour income, 
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who could significantly reduce their tax rates by incorporating. This tension was an important reason 
for the 2006 tax reform (Finansdepartementet, 2011).  
 
4.2 The 2006 Tax Reform 
The Norwegian tax reform of 2006 was essentially a revision of the dual income tax system, and 
introduced important changes to the tax system. Of the most important changes were reduced 
surtax rates and the introduction of the enterprise model (“foretaksmodellen”), the shareholder 
model (“aksjonærmodellen”) and the participant model (“deltakermodellen”). Together, they gave a 
more equal treatment of income earned in different organisational forms and of income derived 
from capital and labour. In the following the change in the marginal tax rates for the self-employed 
will be used to identify tax induced behavioural responses. 
 
4.2.1 Changes in income taxation 
Changes in the income taxation are central to identification of the elasticities, as they induce 
exogenous variation in marginal tax rates for the self-employed. Given that data for 2001 to 2010 is 
used, the baseline tax rate on both wage and business income was 28 percent for all the years 
considered. The surtax rates consist of two steps, where the first step was an additional tax rate of 
13.5 percent in 2001 and the second step 19.5 percent. This had changed to 9 percent and 12 
percent respectively in 2010, as seen in Figure 1. In addition, the bracket for which income level the 
surtax was induced changed over the years. The bracket for the first step stay fairly constant in year 
2000 fixed NOK, while the bracket for the second step was reduced significantly from 2004 to 2007, 
as seen in Figure 2.   
When the split model was abolished, some of the really high income earners experienced increased 
marginal tax rates. However, each year less than one percent of the self-employed individuals earn 
more than the limit for returning to low constant income tax rates, and the particulars of this feature 
will therefore not be dealt with.  
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Figure 1: Surtax rates 
 
Figure 2: Wage adjusted surtax brackets 
 
Year 2000 is the base year.  
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The changes in both rates and brackets give important variation in the marginal tax rates applied to 
each self-employed. In addition to these changes, there is a more lenient tax treatment for 
individuals who live in the most northern part of Norway. Their base level was 24.5 percent, 
compared to the 28 percent for the rest of the country, for all the years considered. The surtax rate 
in bracket one was also lower, and the rate there was 9.5 percent until 2005, when it was reduced to 
7 percent. For the second step in the surtax, the tax rates were the same independent of where in 
the country income was earned. The changes in brackets and regional variation are advantageous in 
the identification of effects. 
 
4.2.2 The enterprise reform 
The enterprise reform (”foretaksreformen”) involved changes to the procedure of how the self-
employed were taxed. With the reform, the imputed labour system was abolished, and a shielding 
method (“skjermingsmetoden”) was introduced, where the shielded income is computed by a risk 
free allowed return to capital investment. The risk free return is calculated by the amount of capital 
in the firm and the rate-of-return allowance, where the allowance rate is set by the government. 
Then income above the risk free return is taxed as personal income, subject to surtax rates and social 
security contributions. This is close to the earlier split model, in that the return to self-employment is 
still taxed as personal income and made liable for the surtax, which means that for most self-
employed marginal tax rates were probably not affected much by this change. 
For shareholders (“foretaksmodellen”) and partners in partnerships (“deltakermodellen”) taxation on 
the personal level begins when returns and capital gains are realised and are above the normal rate 
of return set by the government. The exemption method included in the shareholder model means 
that dividends are now taxed both at the corporate and the individual level, with the risk-free 
allowance taxed only at the corporate level. These changes made the tax treatment of shareholders 
and partners in partnerships more equal to that of the self-employed, which then most likely 
reduced the incentives for organisational shifting among the self-employed. The impact of these 
changes will not be directly investigated, but will affect the measurement of tax responses as the 
composition of tax-payers among the self-employed is influenced by this. 
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4.3 Data 
As discussed in the Introduction, two data sets are used in the empirical analysis. The first is Income 
Statistics for Families and Persons (Statistics Norway, 2005) and the second is the Labour Force 
Survey (Statistics Norway, 2003). Because both data sets include personal ID numbers, the same 
characteristics and marginal tax levels can be computed for both empirical analyses by utilizing the 
information provided in the income data set.  
There are multiple definitions of the self-employed used in the literature, from self-reported self-
employed, owners of businesses that are not incorporated, to how much of their income is related to 
self-employment activity. I follow the last route for my definitions. The first definition of self-
employment used here is obtained from a restriction of business earnings higher than wage earnings. 
This means that the self-employed I consider may have wage income, but that their main income is 
derived from self-employment.  
A second categorization used is based on excluding self-employed in the primary industries. The main 
reason for excluding the primary sector is that they are subsidised, which can influence their 
responses to taxation, especially if the subsidies change at the same as the taxes. A limitation with 
both definitions is that they only include the self-employed that do not run losses. Hence, the 
definitions give the individuals that have self-employment as their main source of income.  
As mentioned, the analysis is restricted to 2001 to 2010, because these are the years around the 
reform, the number of self-employed is fairly stable over these years and all the important variables I 
need are available in the data sets for these years. As Figure 3 shows, the number of self-employed 
according to both definitions has been fairly stable in Norway around the tax reform of 2006. 
However, this does not mean that it has not been a large amount of entry and exit into self-
employment in this period. 
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Figure 3: Number of self-employed individuals each year 
 
 
4.3.1 Income register data: panel 
In the estimation of the ETI, register panel data of all incomes for persons in Norway is exploited. 
Some characteristics and other information about the individuals are also available in the dataset. In 
addition to addressing information for the time period 2001 to 2010, I restrict to individuals with 
non-missing and non-zero self-employment income from 2004 to 2007, to those with higher self-
employment income than wage earnings from over the same period, and to self-employed who are 
between 20 and 65 years old in 2005. This leaves me with almost 100,000 individuals over 10 years. 
These are the individuals who have self-employment income as their primary income source in the 
years around the reform. Descriptive statistics for this group of self-employed are given in Table 1, 
Table 2 and Table 3. 
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Table 1: Income and net-of-tax rates 
 Reported income Net-of-tax rates 
 Mean Mean 
2001 293381 0.656 
 (298203)  
   
2002 308696 0.662 
 (281917)  
   
2003 309521 0.668 
 (285493)  
   
2004 337262 0.665 
 (304787)  
   
2005 357667 0.673 
 (369662)  
   
2006 389359 0.681 
 (399292)  
   
2007 424129 0.676 
 (419028)  
   
2008 432964 0.677 
 (380179)  
   
2009 433379 0.681 
 (392211)  
   
2010 450710 0.681 
 (411787)  
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses 
 
Table 2: Observable characteristics 
 Mean 
  
Sex 0.74 
  
Age 47.9 
  
Children 0.54 
  
Married 0.58 
  
Birth country 0.92 
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Table 3: Education 
Educational level Percentage 
  
No education 0.1 
  
Primary school 0.2 
  
Secondary school 17.5 
  
High school, started 19.6 
  
High school, completed 
 
High school, supplement 
 
University, undergrad 
 
University, postgrad 
 
Research degree 
 
Unknown 
29.4 
 
2.5 
 
16.1 
 
12.6 
 
0.4 
 
1.6 
 
Educational field Percentage 
  
General 27.4 
  
Humanities and arts 5.9 
  
Teaching 2.3 
  
Social science and law 4.6 
  
Business and 
administration 
 
Science, crafts and 
technology 
 
Health, social and sports 
 
Agriculture and fishery  
 
Transport, security and 
services 
 
Unknown 
10.3 
 
 
24.9 
 
 
14.3 
 
2.0 
 
5.9 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
I use the tax base for the surtax as my dependent variable. Marginal tax rates are computed given 
income in the surtax base and using information about the tax system from Skatteetaten (2015). As 
seen in Table 1, net-of-tax rates increased in 2005 and 2006, supporting the presumption that the 
2006 tax reform lowered marginal tax rates on average. However, they did not go down by much. 
This is likely because although surtax rates were reduced, so were also the limit for paying surtax 
bracket two, which meant that more people were paying the surtax after 2006. In addition the 
marginal tax rates for some high income earners increased; see the description of the tax schedule 
for the self-employed in Section 4.1.  
In Table 2 it is seen that 74 percent of the self-employed considered are male, the average age is 47.9 
years, 54 percent have children, 58 percent are married and 92 percent are born in Norway. 
Dummies for level and field of education are created by information provided in the income data set. 
The description of the Norwegian Standard Education Classification is provided in Statistics Norway 
(2000). As seen in Table 3, most of the self-employed have high school completion as their highest 
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level of education and a general field of education. Dummies for each county in Norway are created 
by information about to which municipality income is reported.  
 
4.3.2 Labour force survey: repeated cross-section 
To obtain separate response estimates based on working hours information from the Labour Force 
Survey (“Arbeidskraftundersøkelsen”) for the time period 2001 to 2010 is used. The Labour Force 
Survey is a sample survey and respondents report their hours of work in the main occupation and in 
total. About 24,000 people are asked each quarter, and some are asked two or three quarters, but 
not all. These data will be exploited as repeated cross section in the following. There are both 
advantages and disadvantages to this. An important disadvantage is that panel data methods are not 
available. An advantage is that the problem of mean reversion will not be present, as there are 
mostly different people observed each year; see Giertz (2008) for a discussion. The number of 
observed individuals is smaller in this dataset than for the income data.  
As mentioned, the data consists both of hours of work in main occupation and in total. I use hours of 
work in the main occupation as the main variable. The data restrictions will imply that working hours 
in self-employment is derived.  
Survey data can be less reliable than register data because of potential misreporting. The problem 
can be especially large for working hours of the self-employed, as their working hours are not 
necessarily well-defined. What is important in my case is that the misreporting is the same for those 
who experienced changes in their marginal tax level and those who did not. This does not seem 
entirely implausible. Some of the measurement problems will then be differenced out by the 
identification method. 
The treated group is the self-employed who have lower marginal tax rates after the reform than they 
would have had absent the reform. The first control group (Control group 1) consists of those who 
are self-employed and have the same marginal tax levels as they would have had absent the reform. 
The second control group (Control group 2) consists both of self-employed and wage earners that 
have the same marginal tax levels as they would have had absent the reform. To obtain good control 
groups, I restrict to those that earned more than 200,000 NOK, and who were more than 20 and less 
than 60 years old in 2005. Some descriptive statistics about the groups are given in Table 5, Table 6 
and Table 7.  
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Table 4: Hours of work 
 Treated Control 1 Control 2 
 Hours of work Net-of-tax rate Hours of work Net-of-tax rate Hours of work Net-of-tax rate 
Before reform 41.1 0.616 41.5 0.720 34.8 0.720 
 (9.0)  (9.4)  (6.1)  
       
After reform 40.8 0.652 40.1 0.710 34.2 0.714 
 (9.1)  (9.9)  (6.8)  
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses 
 
Table 5: Observable characteristics 
 Treated Control 1 Control 2 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Sex 0.79 0.71 0.32 
    
Age 47.8 48.9 44.7 
    
Child 0.58 0.58 0.54 
    
Married 0.61 0.64 0.52 
    
Birth country 0.93 0.96 0.94 
 
 
Table 6: Education 
Educational level Treated Control 1 Control 2 
 Percentage Percentage Percentage 
No education 0.0 0.0 0.1 
    
Primary school 0.1 0.0 0.1 
    
Secondary school 15.3 20.1 16.5 
    
High school, started 16.2 26.6 23.0 
    
High school, completed 
 
High school, supplement 
 
University, undergrad 
 
University, postgrad 
 
Research degree 
 
Unknown 
28.0 
 
2.4 
 
16.6 
 
19.2 
 
0.8 
 
1.3 
35.5 
 
2.2 
 
11.3 
 
3.35 
 
0.0 
 
0.9 
33.3 
 
2.9 
 
21.6 
 
1.6 
 
0.1 
 
0.7 
 
 
 
Educational field Treated Control 1 Control 2 
 Percentage Percentage Percentage 
General 24.0 27.1 28.1 
    
Humanities and arts 4.0 5.1 4.7 
    
Teaching 2.4 2.3 7.5 
    
Social science and law 5.8 0.0 1.4 
    
Business and 
administration 
 
Science, crafts and 
technology 
 
Health, social and sports 
 
Agriculture and fishery  
 
Transport, security and 
services 
 
Unknown 
10.0 
 
 
25.8 
 
 
20.6 
 
2.0 
 
3.7 
 
 
1.8 
10.6 
 
 
27.4 
 
 
9.2 
 
2.9 
 
14.5 
 
 
0.9 
14.8 
 
 
18.6 
 
 
19.2 
 
1.5 
 
2.9 
 
 
1.3 
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Table 4 shows the average hours worked in main occupation for the three groups and their marginal 
tax rates, before and after the tax reform. There has been a reduction in working hours in all groups, 
but the reduction is largest among the self-employed used as controls. The treated have experienced 
increased net-of-tax rates, while the two control groups experienced slightly lower net-of-tax rates.   
In Table 5 and Table 6 it is seen that the treated and the first control group, the self-employed, have 
largely the same characteristics as in the income data. This is reassuring for the use of the Labour 
Force Survey data. The second control group have different characteristics, as wage earners differ 
from the self-employed in some aspects.  
 
4.4 Specifications 
Here I present the strategies for identification of the ETI and the working hours elasticity for the self-
employed. The two strategies share important features, in that they are both quasi-experimental and 
rely on some individuals being more treated and some less treated, and then comparing across 
treatment statuses. In addition, both approaches rely on a common trend assumption, which is 
explained and addressed separately for the two strategies. 
The methodology presented here identifies effects on the self-employed that are treated, which 
means the effects will only be measured for those who are affected by the tax reform. For the 
income estimation, the effect measured will be the change in income caused by changes in marginal 
tax rates for those who experienced changes in marginal tax rates as a result of the tax reform. For 
the hours of work estimation, the effect measured will be the change in working hours caused by 
changes in marginal tax rates for those who experienced lower marginal tax rates as a result of the 
tax reform. As these are estimates only for the groups affected by the reform, they are not general 
averages for the whole population. This means that the estimates can only have external validity for 
tax changes affecting the same groups as the 2006 tax reform. As the tax changes mainly affected 
middle and high income earners, the behavioural responses obtained here may be different 
compared to corresponding estimates for low income earners. However, because the groups the 
effects are measured on are fairly broad, the estimates are not without some generality.  
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4.4.1 Panel data analysis 
To estimate the ETI for the self-employed, I use the panel dataset for incomes described in the 
preceding section. My specification follows closely techniques described in Gruber and Saez (2002), 
Kopczuk (2005) and Heim (2010). Given the large sample size, the focus will be on consistency of the 
estimates, and not on finite sample properties or the standard errors. 
I follow the literature by using three-year differences, which is a first differences approach where the 
variable three time periods before is subtracted instead of the period before. Three-year differences 
are used to estimate a medium term response and to avoid picking up the potentially large short 
term income shifting responses. 
To see the properties of this, let the underlying relationship be 
 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜈𝑡 + 𝛽 ln(1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜓𝑡𝐵𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  , (4.1) 
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is taxable income for individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡 and (1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡) is the net of marginal tax rate 
for the same individual in the same time period. A log-log specification is used to estimate the 
elasticity directly, in addition to the fact that it is often a better way to estimate effects on incomes, 
as the log will reduce the importance of very large incomes. 𝑐𝑖 is an unobserved time non-varying 
effect, or in other words, an unobserved characteristic that has a constant relationship with income. 
If  𝑐𝑖 is correlated with ln(1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡), not using a difference method can lead to a large omitted 
variable bias. 𝜈𝑡 is a time specific effect. 𝐵𝑖  contains individual characteristics that are time-invariant, 
but that can change relationship with income over time, see Auten and Carroll (1999), and 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
contains characteristics that may change over time and which relation to the dependent variable 
may change over time. The error term is assumed to be independently and identically distributed.  
In three year differences we have 
 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑡) − ln (𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3) . (4.2) 
Hence, 
 ln (
𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3
) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  , (4.3) 
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is taxable income in year 𝑡, 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3 is taxable income in the base year, 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 is the marginal tax 
rate in year 𝑡, and 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3 is the marginal tax rate at the base year, and 𝛼𝑡 is the differenced time-
specific constant. The same goes for the time varying effect of observable characteristics, which 
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difference now can be written as 𝜃 and 𝜂, assuming that the characteristics have a time constant 
effect on the difference in income. By differencing, the unobserved time non-varying effect is 
removed.  
The first-differences estimator is just the OLS estimator on differenced variables. However, the 
marginal tax rates are clearly endogenous, as they are decided by the income level. This means that 
naïvely estimating income as the regressand and the marginal tax rate as the regressor will lead to a 
bias. Therefore, it is necessary to use an instrumental variable approach. 
I follow the literature, and use as instrument the tax rate in year 𝑡 applied to income in year 𝑡 − 3, 
inflated by income growth. This means that ln (
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) is instrumented by ln (
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
), where 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
𝐼  is 
the marginal tax rate in year 𝑡 applied to income in year 𝑡 − 3, inflated by income growth for all 
three years. The instrument is in a sense the marginal tax rate that would have been faced if there 
were no behavioural responses. This is the change in the tax rate that is only due to the tax reform. 
To estimate first-differences with IV, standard 2SLS is used, which gives the estimator 
 ?̂?𝐹𝐷 𝐼𝑉 = ((𝑍𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡−3)
′(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡−3))
−1
(𝑍𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡−3)
′(yt − 𝑦𝑡−1) , (4.4) 
where (𝑍𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡−3) is the instrument for (𝑋𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡−3). 
To be a good instrument, in the sense that it will give consistent estimates, it needs to be valid and 
relevant. Relevance is easily checked by the first stage, and it is clear that the tax rates that would 
have been faced had income not changed, will be strongly correlated with the actual tax rates. The 
instrument is valid if it is uncorrelated with the error term in Equation 4.4 and it is rightly excluded 
from Equation 4.4. These are the independence assumption and the exclusion restriction. The latter 
will hold if the change in the marginal tax rates that is only due to the reform only affects the 
changes in income through the changes in the marginal tax levels. 
The crucial identifying assumption is instrument validity, which in this case can be written as 
 𝐸 (ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−3)) = 0 . (4.5) 
It is a fairly strong assumption, and the main problem is mean reversion. It follows from exceptionally 
high income one year being more likely to be followed by less income the next year. The same holds 
in the opposite direction for particularly low incomes one year. This can seriously bias the estimates, 
likely downwards for a tax decrease, as high earners are more likely to be lower earners next period, 
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while it is the opposite for low earners. Another problem of the same character is exogenous trends 
in income. If, simultaneously as the tax reform there is a trend towards greater inequality, meaning 
that the high income earners increase their income more than the low income earners, that is not 
related to the tax levels, this will result in biased estimates. Of course, there can be a trend towards 
greater equality as well, leading to the same problem in the opposite direction. If there is a trend 
towards greater inequality that is not caused by the tax levels, then this will bias the estimates 
upwards for a tax decrease. The two issues probably work in opposite directions, but there is nothing 
indicating that the effect of trends in income and of mean reversion should cancel out.  
To address these issues, I follow Auten and Caroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002), and include the 
log of base year income on the right hand side. This changes the interpretation of the instrument, so 
the instrument is valid if it is uncorrelated with the error term given the log of base year income.  
In addition, I add some observable characteristics and time dummies. If the change in income is 
affected by some unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the changes in the marginal 
tax rates, this can be a problem. The problem is addressed by including dummies for the 
characteristics sex, age, having children, marriage, being born in Norway, educational level, 
educational field and county. The specification is then 
 ln (
𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3
) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (4.6) 
where ln (
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) is instrumented by ln (
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
), ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3) is log of income in the base year and  𝛼𝑡 
are the time dummies. 𝐵𝑖  contains the non-time varying covariates and 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 contains the potentially 
time-varying covariates. 
To better control for mean reversion and trends in income, the literature has turned to adding 
splines in the log of base year income. These splines are nonlinear functions at some specified points 
of the income distribution. Gruber and Saez (2002) propose adding ten piece splines in the log of 
base year income, at each decile of the income distribution. Kopczuk (2005) argues that splines in the 
lagged of base year income and in the deviation of lagged of base year income from base year 
income, will be a better approach. These approaches can be seen as 
 ln (
𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3
) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  , (4.7) 
in the Gruber and Saez speciation, and 
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ln (
𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3
) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑡−4)
+ 𝜋𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 ln (
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−4
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  , 
(4.8) 
in the Kopczuk spefication. 
These equations are estimated by 2SLS where the instrument is as specified above. 
The error terms may exhibit both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. To account for this, 
standard errors are clustered at the individual level, which then is robust to both serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity.  
In Appendix A.2, the system is modelled to provide a presentationally different, though essentially 
equivalent, explanation of the role of the instruments and the controls for trends and mean 
reversion. 
 
4.4.2 Repeated cross-section analysis 
As already noted, in the estimation of effects on working hours a standard difference-in-differences 
methodology is followed, as repeated observations of individuals’ working hours are not available; 
see for example Angrist and Pischke (2009) on the method. The main idea is to assign some 
individuals to a treatment group and some to a control group, and then compare the two groups 
before and after an exogenous change in policy. Hence, the difference from the panel data analysis is 
that the unobserved effect is differenced out on the group level instead of at the individual level. The 
central part of the difference-in-differences approach is therefore to construct a comparable 
treatment and control group. Then the difference-in-differences estimator is the difference between 
the difference in means before and after the policy change. It can be employed in a regression 
framework by using a dummy for being treated, a dummy for post reform or for each year, and an 
interaction dummy between treated and post reform. With the regression framework, controls can 
also be added, in this way 
 ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜉 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖 + 𝜆𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑄𝑡 + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  , (4.9) 
where ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is working hours, 𝜉 is a constant, 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy for being treated or not, 𝑄𝑡is a dummy for 
post reform, 𝐷𝑠𝑄𝑡 is the interaction between the two preceding dummies, 𝐵𝑖  contains characteristics 
which do not change over time,  𝑀𝑖,𝑡 contains characteristics that may change over time. The post 
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reform dummy can be changed to time dummies for each period, 𝛼𝑡, where the identification will be 
exactly the same, but more time varying effects will be controlled for. 
The crucial identifying assumption is the common trend assumption, which means that if the reform 
did not take place, the trends in the parameter of interest would have been the same for the 
treatment and the control group. This can be written by considering the counterfactual assumption 
that 
 𝐸[ℎ𝑖,𝑡
𝑜  | 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝐵𝑖,𝑀𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 , (4.10) 
where ℎ𝑖,𝑡
𝑜  is the potential outcome of individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡, absent the reform, 𝑠 is which group the 
individual belongs to, 𝑡 is the time period, 𝛾𝑠 is the group-specific effect,  𝛼𝑡 is the time trend, while 𝜃 
and 𝜂 are the effects of other individual characteristics. This means that the potential outcome in the 
absence of the reform should be additive in structure, which is necessary because what the 
difference-in-differences does, is to account for differences on the group level and time trends that 
are equal for both groups. Hence, given the characteristics of the individuals, there should be a 
separate additive effect of belonging to the treated or the control group, 𝛾𝑠, and a separate additive 
effect of the time trend, 𝛼𝑡, which must be equal for the treatment and control groups. Then the 
treatment effect can be identified. 
In the same way as with panel data, exogenous trends in the parameter of interest would cause 
trouble. The problem is that exogenous trends would mean that the time trend absent the reform 
would not be equal for each of the groups, in other words a violation of the common trend 
assumption. However, to control for a base year variable is not as important in this application as 
with the income analysis because mostly different people are observed each year and then there is 
no mean reversion.  
The treated are defined as those that had higher instrumented marginal tax rates in the three years 
following the reform, compared to the three years preceding the reform. The control group is 
defined as those that had the same instrumented marginal tax rates in the three years following the 
reform as the three years preceding the reform. Hence, the 𝑄-variable takes the value one if the 
individual is assigned to the treatment group, zero if the individual is assigned to the control group 
and is missing otherwise. The “instrument” used to define the treatment groups is the same as in the 
ETI-estimation, namely the marginal tax rates that would have been faced, had income stayed the 
same as three years ago, corrected for inflation, which is 
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 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) . (4.11) 
Post reform is defined as after 2005, while pre reform is defined as before 2005. Two main 
specifications are used. One where the dependent variable is reported hours worked each week in 
levels form and the other in log-form. Furthermore, as there are data limitations in this application, I 
will first use self-employed as both treatment and control, and then add wage earners to the control 
group to improve the precision of the estimates. Dummies for the characteristics sex, age, having 
children, marriage, born in Norway, educational level, educational field and county are added. The 
specifications are then 
 ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑄𝑡 + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (4.12) 
 log(ℎ𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑄𝑡 + 𝜃𝐵𝑖 + 𝜂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , (4.13) 
where ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is reported hours worked per week, 𝛼𝑡 are time dummies, 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy for being treated 
or not, 𝐷𝑖𝑄𝑡 is an interaction dummy between treated and post reform. 𝐵𝑖  contains the non-time 
varying covariates and 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 contains the potentially time-varying covariates. 
The elasticity of hours must be multiplied by  
𝑤ℎ
𝑧
  to obtain an indication of what proportion the 
hours of work response is of the ETI, as showed in Equation 2.25 and Equation 2.26.  
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5. Results 
Equation Chapter (Ne xt) Secti on 1  
This section presents the main empirical findings in the thesis. 
 
5.1 Elasticity of Taxable Income 
Table 7: ETI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
Net-of-tax rate -3.037*** -1.067*** 0.131*** 0.201*** 0.215*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
      
Age -0.004*** -0.009*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.007*** -0.002 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Birth country -0.003 0.001 -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Children 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Married 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
N 577683 577649 577649 577649 495363 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
 
Table 7 reports the results of five different specifications to obtain estimates of the ETI for the self-
employed. The first column in the table present ordinary least squares estimates on the differenced 
equation, resulting in a clearly negative parameter estimate for the net-of-tax-rate. With IV and not 
controlling for base year income, corresponding to the specification in Equation 4.6, the estimated 
elasticity is still negative. Controlling for base year income gives positive estimates. First, a simple 
control results in an elasticity of 0.13 (column 3). Introducing splines in base year income further 
increases the estimated elasticity, to 0.20 (column 4), with the Gruber and Saez specification, 
corresponding to the specification in Equation 4.8, and 0.22 (column 5), with the Kopczuk 
specification, corresponding to the specification in Equation 4.9. The interpretation of the last 
estimate is that if the net-of-tax rate increases by one percent, income increases by 0.22 percent. 
Because the estimates should be comparable to the corresponding estimates for the effect on 
working hours, not all control variables are included in the estimation leading to Table 7. 
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Table 8: ETI with additional control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
Net-of-tax rate -3.040*** -1.060*** 0.159*** 0.135*** 0.188*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
      
Age -0.002*** -0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared 0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.009*** -0.005*** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.067*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Birth country 0.001 -0.003 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
Children 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Married 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
N 493441 493414 493414 493414 423229 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables, splines, county, education level and educational field are not shown 
In Table 8, results when adding additional control variables are presented (leading up to a similar 
distinction for working hours). The parameter estimates are not influenced much by this, but the 
result in the Gruber-Saez specification is to some extent different.  
Results of further sensitivity analyses are presented in Appendix A.3.1. I find the results to be fairly 
stable across specifications, and the Kopczuk specification to be the most stable. The estimates of the 
ETI for the Kopczuk specification are 0.153 when only those that earn higher business income than 
wage income for all the ten years are included and 0.147 when those that earn more income from 
business in the primary sector than other sectors are excluded. It is 0.189 when income less than 
100,000 is excluded, 0.164 with business income as the dependent variable, and 0.173 when the 
sample is restricted to individuals with nonzero and non-missing business income for all years in 
addition to the restriction used in the baseline estimation. It is 0.225 when the estimation is done on 
self-employed that are also in the working hours data set; in other words those that have been part 
of the Labour Force Survey. The estimated elasticity is 0.077 when addressing tax-payers with 
nonzero and non-missing business income for all years are considered. That this elasticity is 
considerably lower is not surprising, as this is a very wide definition of self-employment, meaning 
that many of these individuals will have wage earning as their main activity.  
Compared to Thoresen and Vattø’s (2013) estimate of an ETI of about 0.05 for wage earners for the 
same tax reform, the self-employed seem to respond more. This is expected, as the self-employed 
have larger possibilities for choosing their own working hours and shelter taxes. Kleven and Schultz 
(2014) obtain an ETI of 0.10 for the self-employed in Denmark, and they find it to be about twice as 
large as the ETI for wage earners. According to the results presented here, the Norwegian self-
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employed seem to respond more in the years around the 2006 tax reform than the Danish self-
employed around the reforms considered by Kleven and Schultz. Their definition of self-employed is 
however less restrictive than mine, which may account for some of the difference in elasticity 
measured. My ETI results are very close to the elasticities obtained on Danish data by Le Maire and 
Scherning (2013) using the bunching method and controlling for income shifting. Heim’s (2010) 
estimate of an ETI of 0.9 for the self-employed is much larger than the present estimates. However, 
when Heim deduct the response due to tax evasion, an ETI of 0.4 is found, and this is closer to the 
estimates presented here.  
 
5.2 Elasticity of Working Hours 
 
5.2.1 Graphical evidence 
Next, estimates for the hours of work specifications (see Equation 4.12 and Equation 4.13) are 
presented. First, Figure 4 and Figure 5 give a picture of the development of working hours for the tax-
payers experiencing an increase in the net-of-tax-rate induced by the reform and the control group 
including wage earners.  
 
Figure 4: Hours of work for the treatment and control group (wage earners included) 
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Figure 5: Difference in hours worked between treatment and control group (wage earners included) 
  
 
As seen in Figure 4, for all the years considered, average weekly work hours are higher for the 
treated than for the control group. This is because the self-employed on average work more hours 
than wage earners. Figure 5 shows that the difference in hours between the treated and the control 
group increases right after the tax reform, which may indicate that the treated self-employed have 
responded to the fall in marginal tax rates. However, the difference falls steeply in 2009. If the 
financial crisis had a larger negative impact on high self-employed income than low self-employed 
and wage earned income, this may explain the fall in that year. For the difference-in-differences to 
give meaningful estimates, the common trend assumption is crucial. Figure 4 shows trends in 
working hours being fairly similar for the treatment and control group before the 2006 tax reform, 
supporting the validity of the common trend assumption. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 give a picture of the development of working hours for the treated and the 
control group containing only self-employed. 
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Figure 6: Hours worked for the treatment and control group (self-employed only) 
 
 
Figure 7: Difference in hours worked between treatment and control group (self-employed only) 
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As seen in Figure 7, when only using data on the self-employed (excluding wage earners from the 
control group), the picture is less clear. There is a steep increase in the difference in hours just after 
the tax reform, but already the year after (2007) working hours return back. On average, hours 
worked seem to be fairly equal for the high and low earning self-employed. 
Further graphical analyses are provided in the Appendix A.3.2, where the difference in average hours 
worked is looked at by its change from the year before. Descriptions are basically the same as here.  
 
5.2.1 Estimated elasticity 
Table 9: Elasticity of working hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level – large control Log – large control 
Tax treatment 0.016 0.005 0.236 0.012* 
 (0.613) (0.016) (0.225) (0.007) 
     
Treated -0.640 -0.014 4.801*** 0.112*** 
 (0.445) (0.012) (0.161) (0.005) 
     
Children -0.778** -0.021** -0.518*** -0.016*** 
 (0.372) (0.010) (0.070) (0.002) 
     
Married 0.071 0.002 -0.535*** -0.016*** 
 (0.359) (0.009) (0.065) (0.002) 
     
Birth country 3.304*** 0.089*** 0.155 0.003 
 (0.618) (0.016) (0.126) (0.004) 
     
Sex 6.479*** 0.171*** 3.848*** 0.113*** 
 (0.364) (0.009) (0.060) (0.002) 
     
Age 0.592*** 0.016*** 0.129*** 0.004*** 
 (0.143) (0.004) (0.023) (0.001) 
     
Age squared -0.007*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant 22.238*** 3.180*** 32.067*** 3.452*** 
 (3.435) (0.089) (0.500) (0.015) 
N 3822 3822 48779 48779 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies are not shown 
Table 9 reports the estimation results when applying four different specifications. The first column is 
hours in level form as the dependent variable and using data on the self-employed, the second 
column is with hours in log form and exploiting data on the self-employed, the third column is with 
hours in level form and including wage earners in the control group, the fourth column is with hours 
in log form and wage earners included. Estimates of the tax effect are reported in the first row, and 
differ according to specification. The coefficient found in the first column translates to an elasticity of 
working hours of 0.008 and the second column translates to an elasticity of 0.095. With the wage 
earners included in the control group (column 3 and 4), the estimates translate to elasticities of 
working hours of 0.114 and 0.191 for the level and log specification, respectively.   
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Only for the log specification and including wage earners is a significant effect found. This approach is 
found more stable across other changes to specifications, and can be seen as the baseline estimate. 
The interpretation is that if the net-of-tax rate increases by one percent, hours of work increases by 
0.19 percent. 
Considering the preceding graphs, the results are not surprising. The effect is larger when wage 
earners are also used as controls, in addition to the increased power by having more observations in 
the control group. Both indicate a larger and more significant treatment effect for column 3 and 4 in 
Table 9.  
Table 10: Elasticity of working hours with additional control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level – large control Log – large control 
Tax treatment 0.172 0.008 0.099 0.007 
 (0.903) (0.023) (0.396) (0.010) 
     
Treated 0.357 0.010 4.676*** 0.107*** 
 (0.696) (0.018) (0.307) (0.008) 
     
Children -0.920* -0.027** -0.551*** -0.017*** 
 (0.479) (0.012) (0.092) (0.003) 
     
Married -0.042 -0.000 -0.660*** -0.020*** 
 (0.475) (0.012) (0.087) (0.003) 
     
Birth country 1.399 0.039 0.242 0.007 
 (0.942) (0.026) (0.188) (0.006) 
     
Sex 6.184*** 0.166*** 3.346*** 0.097*** 
 (0.564) (0.015) (0.099) (0.003) 
     
Age 0.370* 0.009* 0.052 0.001 
 (0.216) (0.005) (0.032) (0.001) 
     
Age squared -0.004* -0.000* -0.001* -0.000* 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Constant 26.037*** 3.327*** 36.633*** 3.577*** 
 (5.247) (0.133) (1.810) (0.050) 
N 3023 3023 35744 35744 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on dummies for year, county, education level and educational field are not shown 
In Table 10, the possibility of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms is addressed, 
as in the ETI estimation. In addition, controls for level and field of education and in which county 
income is reported are added. These estimates translate to elasticities of 0.084, 0.157, 0.048 and 
0.126, for each specification, respectively. The coefficients change to some extent, standard errors 
increase for all specifications, which leads to that none of the treatment effects are found significant. 
However, I do not interpret the loss of significance as an inherent failure of the procedure, but rather 
that it reflects the large heterogeneity in responses to taxation. More data would be necessary to 
obtain a statistically significant effect with these specifications. Nonetheless, the results indicate that 
the elasticity of working hours is positive and smaller in magnitude than the ETI. One interpretation 
of the elasticity of working hours is that it is a lower bound estimate of “real effects” constituting the 
ETI, as responses contained in the “residual effect” can to some extent also be real.  
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Baseline estimates between 0.19 and 0.22 for the ETI and between 0.13 and 0.19 for the elasticity of 
working hours points to the self-employed being responsive to tax changes, and that there is a 
significant “real” part to ETI. Furthermore, it indicates that the “residual” effect is between 0.03 and 
0.06. Some of the responses composing the residual effect may work in opposite directions, which 
conveys that this is the resulting net residual effect. Interpreting this residual as tax sheltering implies 
an elasticity of sheltering between -0.06 and -0.03. This suggests that income sheltering is small or 
that it does not respond much to tax changes, and that the self-employed responded more by 
changing hours of work than income sheltered.   
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6. Conclusion 
Equation Chapter (Ne xt) Secti on 1  
There are multiple possible tax responses for the self-employed. Six responses were explained and 
surveyed; changes in income, working hours, capital, avoidance and evasion, entry and exit, and 
organisational shifts. The main emphasis was on the ETI and the elasticity of working hours. Heim’s 
(2010) partitioning of the ETI is used to obtain insight into what constitutes the elasticity. To explore 
one aspect of the multiple responses to taxation among the self-employed, I compared the ETI to the 
hours of work elasticity.  
By applying quasi-experimental methods to two data sets, the income register data and the Labour 
Force Survey, estimates of the ETI and the elasticity of working hours were found. A panel data 
approach and a difference-in-differences method were used for the ETI and the elasticity of working 
hours estimations respectively. Issues in the panel data analysis were addressed and, by following 
the earlier literature, controls for mean reversion and trends in income were added.  
My findings indicate that the self-employed respond to reduced marginal tax rates by earning more 
income and working more hours than they would have absent the reform. The effects are however 
fairly small: ETI estimates between 0.19 and 0.22 are found, depending on the choice of controls, and 
estimates of the elasticity of working hours are between 0.13 and 0.19 in the main specifications, 
depending on the same choice of controls. Some main changes to the specifications do not change 
the sign of the tax sheltering response, although the size differs by the specifications chosen. The 
small difference between the ETI and the elasticity of working hours means that the remaining 
effects either are not large or that they work in opposite directions. When the difference is 
interpreted as an “elasticity of sheltering”, it is found to be between - 0.06 and - 0.03 for the main 
specifications. Hence, this indicates that tax sheltering among the self-employed in Norway was 
reduced, and that they responded more by changing hours worked than by changing income 
sheltered when tax levels were reduced by the 2006 tax reform. The small magnitude of the 
sheltering response points to that little income is sheltered or that the amount of sheltering does not 
respond much to taxation.  
Compared to wage earners, this thesis has provided evidence for that the self-employed respond 
more, and that the most important explanation of the difference seems to be that the self-employed 
have larger possibilities to choose their working hours than wage earners have. The response 
estimates are similar to estimates of the self-employed’s tax responsiveness in Denmark. In 
comparison to the U.S., the estimates found for Norway are smaller, but estimates for “real 
responses” differ less. This indicates that reporting responses might be a more important part of the 
47 
 
self-employed’s response to taxation in the U.S. than in Norway. The reason may be that there are 
more possibilities for tax exemptions in the U.S. than in Norway.  
An important limitation in my strategy is that capital responses are not considered. There is little 
evidence on this subject for the self-employed, but if capital responses can be significant and are 
realised in the short term, the sheltering response identified will also include the capital responses of 
the self-employed.  Organisational shifts may also bias the estimate in significant ways. As the 2006 
tax reform changed incentives for organisational shifting, a particularly interesting further 
development would be to control for organisational shifting among the self-employed when 
measuring the ETI.  
The empirical findings indicate that there are low efficiency costs from income taxation of the self-
employed in Norway. However, tax responses of the self-employed is an important and still under-
researched topic. It is necessary to consider the multiple behavioural margins, as one measure 
cannot summarize the tax behaviour of individuals, least of all the self-employed. Relations between 
different margins, especially between the ETI, hours of work, organisational shift and evasion, ought 
to be investigated further. In that sense, this thesis is a small step to improve information on this 
group of tax-payers.  
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Appendix 
 
Equation Chapter (Ne xt) Secti on 1  
A.1 ETI as a Sufficient Statistic 
Following the setup in Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014), the ETI as a sufficient statistic will be derived.  
The self-employed maximize utility, which in this case is assumed to be quasi-linear 
 max 
𝑐,ℎ,𝑠
{𝑢(𝑐, ℎ) = 𝑐 − 𝑓(ℎ)}   𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤ℎ + 𝜏𝑠 − 𝑔(𝑤ℎ, 𝑠) + 𝐸 (A.1) 
where ℎ is hours of work, 𝑓 is a convex cost function of efforts, 𝜏 is the marginal tax rate, w is the 
exogenous wage rate, 𝑠 is income that is sheltered (by legal or illegal means), 𝑔 is the cost function of 
this sheltering and 𝐸 is non-labour income. The model captures the motive for tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. By undertaking some cost, the self-employed can shelter an amount of income 𝑠 from 
taxation, and thus gain the marginal tax rate times the sheltering minus the cost of sheltering. The 
cost function can include various type of costs related to tax sheltering, including the time used to 
shelter or the lower pay received by working in the black market. The cost depends both on the 
amount that is sheltered and the gross income from labour.  
Inserting the constraint into the objective function and differentiating with respect to ℎ and 𝑠 leads 
to the first order conditions 
 ℎ: (1 − 𝜏)𝑤 − 𝑤𝑔1
′ − 𝑤𝑓′ = 0 (A.2) 
 𝑠: 𝜏 − 𝑔2
′ = 0 , (A.3) 
which implicitly defines the optimal hours worked, ℎ∗(𝜏), and the amount sheltered, 𝑠∗(𝜏). 
Consumption is then also chosen optimally,  𝑐∗(𝜏). Obtaining theoretical predictions from 
comparative statics is not immediately feasible in this framework, as the results will depend on the 
particulars of the 𝑔-function. 
Instead of comparative statics, the government is introduced, which will maximize welfare subject to 
the self-employed’s choices of hours, sheltering and consumption. The welfare of the government 
equals the utility of the agents (the number of agents is now normalized to one) plus the revenue 
 𝑊 = 𝑐∗(𝜏) − 𝑓(ℎ∗(𝜏)) + 𝑅 , (A.4) 
where 𝑅 is the tax revenue 
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 𝑅 = 𝜏(𝑤ℎ(𝜏) − 𝑠(𝜏)) = 𝜏𝑧(𝜏) (A.5) 
and 𝑧 is defined as taxable income 
 𝑧 = 𝑤ℎ − 𝑠 . (A.6) 
Hence 
 𝑊 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤ℎ∗(𝜏) + 𝜏𝑠∗(𝜏) − 𝑔(𝑤ℎ∗(𝜏), 𝑠∗(𝜏)) + 𝐸 − 𝑓(ℎ∗(𝜏)) + 𝜏𝑧(𝜏) . (A.7) 
Now, to maximize welfare, the government will use their only instrument, 𝜏. The agents have 
maximized their utility, which means that 𝑐, ℎ and 𝑠 are at their optimal value for a given 𝜏. This 
imply that any small change in the marginal tax rate will not change the optimal behaviour of the 
agent, so the effect of the change in the marginal tax rate on labour supply and sheltering need not 
be considered. Therefore, the only effect of changing 𝜏 will, by the envelope theorem, be the effect 
on tax revenue 
 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝜏
= −𝑤ℎ + 𝑠 + 𝑧 + 𝜏
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜏
= −𝑤ℎ + 𝑠 + 𝑤ℎ − 𝑠 + 𝜏
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜏
= 𝜏
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜏
 . (A.8) 
The change in welfare is exactly the ETI, and the intuition is that as the agent has maximized, there 
will only be a first order effect of changing the marginal tax rate. This shows why the ETI has the 
potential for being a sufficient statistic.  
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A.2 Model of the System 
An equivalent way of explaining the role of the instrument and exogenous trends in income is to 
model the system: 
 ln (
𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3
) = 𝛽 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜌 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3) + 𝜖1𝑖,𝑡 (A.9) 
 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) = 𝜅 ln (
𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜄 ln (
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−3
) + 𝜖2𝑖,𝑡  , (A.10) 
where the first equation is the equation for changes in income, which is the equation of interest. The 
changes in income depend here on the changes in the actual marginal tax rates and on base year 
income. The second equation is an equation for changes in the tax rate, which here is modelled to 
depend on changes in income and on reform induced changes in the marginal tax rate.   
There is a simultaneity problem, as the changes in income are affected by the changes in the 
marginal tax rate, while the changes in marginal tax rate are also affected by the changes in income. 
The changes in the marginal tax rate are in addition affected by the changes in the marginal tax rate 
that is only due to the reform. This can be used as an instrument in the equation for income, as long 
as the tax changes due to the reform do not have any direct effect on the changes in income, but 
only through the actual changes in the marginal tax rates, which seems fairly plausible. This is 
because the self-employed will react to marginal tax rates that actually apply to them, and not to the 
marginal tax rates that would have been, had income not changed. The changes in the actual 
marginal tax rates will however be correlated with the marginal tax rates that would have been 
without changes in income, as the reform will affect the actual marginal tax rates. As the instrument 
induces exogenous variation in the equation for tax changes, the equation for income changes will be 
identified. 
Furthermore, the instrument needs to be uncorrelated with the error term in the income equation. 
This will hold if the changes in the marginal tax rates that are only due to the reform, are 
uncorrelated with shocks to income. For this to hold there needs to be no simultaneous changes in 
income that are not due to the tax reform. By introducing that the change in income also depends on 
itself lagged, this rather strong assumption can be somewhat relaxed. Now, with lagged income on 
the right hand side in the income equation, the instrument needs only be uncorrelated with changes 
in income that are not induced by the tax reform or can be explained by the base year income level.  
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The dependence of the change in income on income lagged can be explained either by a trend in 
inequality not induced by the tax reform, or by mean reversion, that both the high and low earners 
are more likely to be closer to the mean next year. If the high earners have larger changes in income 
through a trend towards inequality, then 𝜌 will be positive, while if mean reversion is important, 𝜌 
will be negative, as there are exogenous negative changes in income for the high earners not induced 
by the changes in tax rates.  
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A.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A.3.1 Elasticity of taxable income 
 
Table 11: ETI excluding all with income from wages higher than business income for all years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
ETI -2.815*** -0.946*** 0.101*** 0.141*** 0.153*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
      
Age -0.004*** -0.008*** 0.000 0.000 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.007*** 0.001 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Birth country -0.000 0.005* -0.010** -0.007** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
Children 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Married 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
N 369817 369809 369809 369809 317068 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
 
 
Table 12: ETI excluding primary sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
ETI -3.037*** -1.056*** -0.012 0.124*** 0.147*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
      
Age  -0.003*** -0.009*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared 0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex  0.008*** -0.005*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Birth country 0.000 -0.003 0.007** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Children 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Married 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
N 394258 394233 394233 394233 337220 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
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Table 13: ETI excluding low reported income  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV  IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
ETI -2.827*** -0.931*** 0.018 0.184*** 0.189*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
      
Age -0.002*** -0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared -0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.008*** -0.001 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Birth country -0.009*** -0.004 -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
      
Children 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Married 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
N 446389 446389 446389 446389 382407 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
 
 
 
Table 14: ETI with business income as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
ETI -2.803*** -0.911*** 0.759*** 0.443*** 0.164*** 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
      
Age 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.001 -0.006** 0.079*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Birth country -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
      
Children 0.004 0.008*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Married 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
N 527730 527705 527703 527703 444215 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
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Table 15: ETI for all with business income nonzero and non-missing for all years and higher business 
than wage earnings around the reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
ETI -2.897*** -0.997*** 0.110*** 0.165*** 0.173*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
      
Age -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.003*** -0.003** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Birth country -0.003 0.003 -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
Children 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Married 0.003** 0.003** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
N 423000 422987 422987 422987 363204 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
 
 
Table 16: ETI for all with business income nonzero and non-missing for all years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
ETI -2.665*** -0.903*** 0.046*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
      
Age -0.003*** -0.007*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.003*** -0.008*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Birth country -0.003 0.002 -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Children 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Married 0.003*** 0.002** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
N 769124 769094 769094 769094 660476 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
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Table 17: ETI on the labour force survey-data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ORD IV IV: Baseyear IV: Gruber Saez IV: Kopczuk 
ETI -2.858*** -0.986*** 0.090 0.097 0.225** 
 (0.048) (0.069) (0.090) (0.092) (0.094) 
      
Age -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.008** -0.009** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Sex 0.003 -0.001 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
Birth country -0.001 0.011 -0.025 -0.023 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
      
Children 0.007 0.008 0.023** 0.020** 0.016 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
      
Married 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
      
N 17067 17067 17067 17067 14616 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies, lagged dependent variables and splines are not shown 
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A.3.2 Elasticity of working hours 
 
Figure 8: Change from last year’s difference in hours worked between treatment and control group 
(wage earners included)
 
 
Figure 9: Change from last year’s difference in hours worked between treatment and control group 
(self-employed only) 
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Table 18: Elasticity of working hours for all with business income higher than zero for 2004-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level – large control Log – large control 
Tax treatment 0.053 0.005 0.265* 0.012*** 
 (0.423) (0.011) (0.156) (0.005) 
     
Treated 0.645** 0.020** 3.188*** 0.074*** 
 (0.304) (0.008) (0.112) (0.003) 
     
Children -0.557** -0.015** -0.517*** -0.016*** 
 (0.262) (0.007) (0.069) (0.002) 
     
Married -0.208 -0.006 -0.561*** -0.016*** 
 (0.254) (0.007) (0.065) (0.002) 
     
Birth country 1.928*** 0.053*** 0.120 0.003 
 (0.473) (0.013) (0.124) (0.004) 
     
Sex 5.645*** 0.155*** 3.811*** 0.112*** 
 (0.252) (0.007) (0.060) (0.002) 
     
Age 0.333*** 0.010*** 0.138*** 0.004*** 
 (0.101) (0.003) (0.022) (0.001) 
     
Age squared -0.004*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant 26.805*** 3.290*** 31.943*** 3.446*** 
 (2.405) (0.064) (0.493) (0.015) 
N 7285 7285 53400 53400 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies are not shown 
Elasticities: 0.03, 0.10, 0.14, 0.21  
 
Table 19: Elasticity of working hours excluding primary sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level – large control Log – large control 
Tax treatment 0.435 0.020 0.398* 0.017** 
 (0.741) (0.020) (0.240) (0.007) 
     
Treated 0.987* 0.022 4.193*** 0.098*** 
 (0.543) (0.015) (0.169) (0.005) 
     
Children -1.129*** -0.029*** -0.601*** -0.018*** 
 (0.404) (0.011) (0.069) (0.002) 
     
Married -0.116 -0.001 -0.556*** -0.016*** 
 (0.393) (0.011) (0.065) (0.002) 
     
Birth country 2.212*** 0.063*** 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.607) (0.016) (0.123) (0.004) 
     
Sex 4.487*** 0.122*** 3.481*** 0.104*** 
 (0.383) (0.010) (0.060) (0.002) 
     
Age 0.677*** 0.019*** 0.111*** 0.004*** 
 (0.161) (0.004) (0.022) (0.001) 
     
Age squared -0.007*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant 20.236*** 3.113*** 32.852*** 3.468*** 
 (3.850) (0.104) (0.494) (0.015) 
N 2706 2706 46562 46562 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies are not shown 
Elasticities: 0.21, 0.37, 0.18, 0.27 
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Table 20: Elasticity of working hours with income controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level – large control Log – large control 
Tax treatment 0.585 0.018 0.128 0.010 
 (0.796) (0.021) (0.293) (0.009) 
     
Treated -1.444** -0.037** 3.453*** 0.064*** 
 (0.712) (0.019) (0.256) (0.008) 
     
Children -1.049** -0.029** -0.552*** -0.017*** 
 (0.445) (0.012) (0.086) (0.003) 
     
Married 0.174 0.005 -0.529*** -0.016*** 
 (0.431) (0.011) (0.080) (0.002) 
     
Birth country 2.847*** 0.077*** 0.028 -0.001 
 (0.721) (0.019) (0.150) (0.004) 
     
Sex 6.254*** 0.166*** 3.676*** 0.107*** 
 (0.429) (0.011) (0.074) (0.002) 
     
Age 0.597*** 0.016*** 0.115*** 0.004*** 
 (0.187) (0.005) (0.029) (0.001) 
     
Age squared -0.007*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Lagged income 0.370 0.015 2.846*** 0.097*** 
 (0.364) (0.010) (0.137) (0.004) 
     
Constant 17.301*** 3.001*** -2.979* 2.257*** 
 (6.207) (0.162) (1.754) (0.053) 
N 2763 2763 34595 34595 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies are not shown 
Elasticities: 0.30, 0.38, 0.06, 0.16 
 
Table 21: Elasticity of working hours exluding large changes in hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level – large control Log – large control 
Tax treatment 0.030 0.003 0.225 0.011* 
 (0.606) (0.016) (0.224) (0.007) 
     
Treated -0.683 -0.015 4.646*** 0.108*** 
 (0.439) (0.011) (0.160) (0.005) 
     
Children -0.689* -0.018* -0.494*** -0.015*** 
 (0.366) (0.009) (0.069) (0.002) 
     
Married 0.188 0.006 -0.530*** -0.016*** 
 (0.354) (0.009) (0.065) (0.002) 
     
Birth country 2.972*** 0.078*** 0.159 0.004 
 (0.612) (0.016) (0.124) (0.004) 
     
Sex 6.026*** 0.157*** 3.766*** 0.111*** 
 (0.361) (0.009) (0.060) (0.002) 
     
Age 0.508*** 0.013*** 0.124*** 0.004*** 
 (0.141) (0.004) (0.022) (0.001) 
     
Age squared -0.006*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant 24.882*** 3.260*** 32.190*** 3.456*** 
 (3.379) (0.087) (0.493) (0.015) 
N 3680 3680 48254 48254 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients on year dummies are not shown 
Elasticities: 0.02, 0.07, 0.11, 0.19 
